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Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading
example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient
unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand why an evolutionary process
might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features in our motivations
and to derive implications for the nature of our utility functions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Individual choice is often accompanied by internal conﬂict. For example, presently-
biased preferences lead to a “multiple selves” setting rich with self-control problems.1
Psychologists have studied the phenomenon on which this paper focuses: the utility of
achoicecandependimportantlyonthesetofsalientalternativechoices. Asaladmaybe
lessattractivewhenpresentedwithinthesightandsmellofagrillingsteak. Anaffairthat
one would never contemplate in the cold light of day becomes difﬁcult to avoid in the
heat of the moment. Cashews are hard to resist on the coffee table, but easy to leave in
the pantry. Such choice-set dependent preferences also generate self-control problems.2
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1See Ainslie (1992), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), and Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) for treatments of
presently-biased preferences. See Rubinstein (2003) for an alternative perspective. Early studies of present
bias and self control by Pollak (1968), Schelling (1984), and Strotz (1956) have engendered a large literature.
For a few examples, see Elster (1985), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b), and Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
2Gardner and Lowinson (1993), Loewenstein (1996), Mischel et al. (1992), and Siegel (1979) examine
the importance of salient alternatives. The resulting choice-set dependent preferences have been modeled
and studied experimentally by Tversky and Simonson (1993) and Shaﬁr et al. (1993). Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001) present a model centered on the assumption that resisting tempting alternatives is costly. Laibson
(2001) examines a model in which instantaneous utilities adjust in response to external cues. The focus of
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tion, and then let him ﬁgure out what to do? Why build an agent who avoids situations
that might lead to an affair, but falls into temptation when one is available? If an in-
tense desire for cashews sitting in a bowl is evolutionarily beneﬁcial, why build an agent
who is content to leave them in the pantry? At a more basic level, given that success-
ful descendants are the currency of evolutionary success, why do people have utility for
anything else?
This paper addresses these questions. Our guiding principle is that to understand
our utility function, we must think through the constraints on what evolution can do
in designing us to make good decisions. We view one such constraint as paramount:
the difﬁculty in equipping us with an accurate prior understanding of the causal and
statistical structure of the world.3
Using a stylized model (presented in Section 2), Section 3.1 begins with the ques-
tion of why agents attach utility to intermediate actions rather than simply to the evo-
lutionary goal of successful descendants. We show that if the agent fully understands
the causal and statistical structure of the world, the utility function “maximize the ex-
pected number of your descendants” does strictly better than one that puts weight on
intermediate actions like eating and having sex. In the absence of such a perfect prior
understanding of the world, however, there is evolutionary value in placing utility on
intermediate actions.4
What determines the utilities that evolution attaches to intermediate actions? One
might think of the utility of a steak as reﬂecting the average evolutionary impact of its
consumption. Section 3.2 explores how this intuition is misleading. First, the utility of
an action should reﬂect not its evolutionary value, but rather that part of the evolution-
ary value not already captured by the agent’s understanding of (and utility for) the con-
sequences of that action. Utility need not be attached to courtship if the agent likes sex
and knows that certain behaviors lead to sex.5 Second, what matters is not how much
of the value of a particular action the agent fails to understand on average, but rather on
this paper is different. We ask why we might have such preferences in the ﬁrst place and why they take the
form they do.
3Forexample,itisrelativelyeasyforrandommutationsandselectiontoadjusttheintensityofoursexual
urges or to create a preference for mates with symmetric features, but it is vastly more difﬁcult to create an
agent who knows that the probability of a successful birth from a random sexual encounter is about 2%
(Einon 1998), that this probability varies systematically with health, age, and other observable features of
the mate, and that asymmetric features are sometimes caused by genetic damage that may transmit to
offspring.
4Robson (2001) provides a complementary rationale for such utilities, based on the value of being able
to cope with evolutionarily novel situations. Agents in Robson’s model must acquire, through experience,
such information as what foods are most useful in a particular environment. Attaching utilities only to de-
scendants gives rise to a small-sample problem that hinders effective learning, and that can be attenuated
by attaching utilities to intermediate goals such as the consumption of certain nutrients.
5Moths seem to be programmed with a utility for “ﬂying toward the light,” presumably reﬂecting their
inability to assess the beneﬁts of the induced contact with other moths.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Information, evolution and utility 121
the margin. A small increase in the utility for an action is relevant to the action chosen
only if the existing utility function and beliefs of the agent happen to make him close to
indifferent about which action to choose. Evolutionarily optimal utility thus reﬂects not
just the (misunderstood) value of the action, but also the information-processing prob-
lem the agent faces in assessing this action in his particular circumstances. This opens
the door to all sorts of seemingly counterintuitive effects in our utility functions.
Once we realize that evolution uses intermediate utilities to compensate for faulty
information processing, it is a small step to think there might be settings where these
intermediateutilitiesareabetterorworseproxyforwhatreallycounts. Indeed,itishard
to imagine a coherent story under which we routinely process information incorrectly,
but the direction and magnitude of our errors is the same across different settings.
Section 4 shows that this naturally leads to choice-set dependence. Imagine that in
evolutionary time, migratory patterns, optimal hunting techniques, and other environ-
mental factors have ﬂuctuated relatively quickly and unpredictably (compared to the
pace of evolution), but in ways the agent might well be able to observe and learn about.
Supposefurtherthatthevalueofeatingandtheprobabilitiesoffaminehavebeenmuch
more stable over the course of evolution—even if there has not been a famine for a long
period, it is still quite possible that there may be one next year.6 Then from “evolution’s”
point of view, the agent has more trustworthy information about hunting than about
eating. If the agent has come to the conclusion that a particular hunting trip is un-
usually dangerous or unlikely to succeed, there is a relatively good chance that the true
stateoftheworldisindeedonewherehuntingisill-advised. Iftheagenthascometothe
conclusion that food is plentiful, and so the risks involved in eating a particular readily
available steak make it not worthwhile, it is still quite likely that the right decision from
an evolutionary point of view is to go ahead.
Now consider the utility that has evolved for a steak. A classical utility function in-
volves a difﬁcult trade-off. A high utility of steak gives the agent incentives to go hunting
even when he thinks it quite dangerous (and so it is relatively likely to be), while a low
utility of steak makes the agent too quick to forgo a readily available steak. Consider an
agentwhogetsamoderateutilityfromeatingsteak, butismadeworseoffbyanuneaten
steak. The utility gain from eating a readily-available steak reﬂects both forces, and so
only strong beliefs about the inadvisability of eating the steak will dissuade the agent.
A decision to go hunting is also partly driven by the anticipated pleasure of eating the
steak. But, if he chooses not to hunt, his utility is not lowered by the presence of an
uneaten steak. As a result, the hunting decision responds more readily to the agent’s
beliefs. Choice-set dependence thus leads to an agent who better matches his decisions
to his environment. The choice set provides useful clues as to how reliable the agent’s
information is likely to be, and hence the relevant balance between what the agent cur-
rently thinks is a good idea and what has worked well in the evolutionary past.
6Incontrast, achangeinmigratorypatternsforevenacoupleyearsmaybegoodevidencethatnextyear
may be different as well. This emphasizes the point that the fundamental difﬁculty is the inability to give
the agent the right prior knowledge that would tell him to update slowly about famine, but quickly about
migration.122 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Section 4.2 presents examples exploring the intuition that the effects of choice-set
dependence will be especially strong when the agent’s information is relatively poor.
Because the optimal degree of choice-set dependence is determined by conditional ex-
pectationsonthemargin, weﬁndarichdependenceofoptimalutilitiesondetailsofthe
settings for which the utilities are designed.
Choice-set dependence, of course, leads to internal conﬂict. An agent in a restau-
rant may choose a steak, but feel he would have been happier had he never entered the
restaurant. He might avoid particular settings even knowing that he will not fall prey
to temptation, simply to avoid the utility effects of a tempting but unchosen alterna-
tive. The point of this paper is that this internal conﬂict is not some evolutionary error
or driven simply by a mismatch between the environment in which we were formed
and the one we now inhabit. Rather, choice-set dependence is an evolutionarily useful
device for tailoring the responsiveness of the agent’s decisions to the value of his infor-
mation in different settings.
Section 5 sketches extensions of this information-processing view of utility func-
tions. For example (and returning to ideas related to those of Robson 2001), we suggest
that evolution is likely to make us especially fearful of dangers whose nature we may be
unable to safely evaluate through experience.
Psychologists have suggested that our behavior is driven partly by a collection of
utility-alteringvisceralurges(Loewenstein1996). Itisstraightforwardtoappreciatewhy
we have urges reﬂecting direct evolutionary consequences such as hunger, thirst, or fa-
tigue (Plutchik 1984). Evolutionary psychologists have explored in some detail how our
behavior is shaped by our evolutionary past, and how modern society is rife with sit-
uations in which current circumstance (abundant food), current wisdom (information
on diet and health), and anachronistic utility functions create internal conﬂict. This ex-
plainswhymanyofusstrugglenottoeattoomuch. Butitdoesnotanswerthequestions
that motivate this paper. Our results help explain why things of no evident evolutionary
value affect our utility, and why the resulting utilities have the patterns they do.7
2. A MODEL
Situations An agent enters the environment and is presented with a situation in which
he can either accept or reject an option (see Figure 1). Accepting the option leads to a
lotterywhoseoutcomeisasuccesswithprobabilityp andafailurewithprobability1−p.
Rejecting the option leads to a success with probability q and a failure with probability
1−q. This is the only decision the agent makes.
We will often think of the option as involving an opportunity to eat and success as
surviving long enough to reproduce. The parameters p and q are random variables,
reﬂecting the beneﬁts of eating and the risks required to do so in any given setting.8 The
7For example, why is it successively harder to exert willpower at the stages “Should I buy this?”, “Should
I serve it?”, and “Should I eat the food in front of me?”
8If p andq are unchanging, then the problem from an evolutionary approach is trivial. Reward the right













FIGURE 1. A situation. The success probabilities p and q are randomly generated by the envi-
ronment, with the agent receiving signals sp and sq about these probabilities. A success yields
utility x, a failure utility 0, and accepting the option yields utility y.
probability of success may be either increased (p >q) or decreased (p <q) by accepting
the option.
Information The agent observes noisy signals of each of the probabilities p and q.
These might reﬂect information the agent has about how dangerous is the pursuit of
food or how dangerous is the decision to not consume. The agent may have informa-
tion as to whether game is plentiful, whether the food is nearby but guarded by a jealous
rival, or whether a drought makes it particularly dangerous to pass up this opportunity.
However, the agent is unlikely to know these probabilities precisely.
We model this by assuming that each situation is accompanied by a pair of scalar
signals sp about p and sq about q. The probabilities p and q are independent, p is a
sufﬁcient statistic for sp, and q is a sufﬁcient statistic for sq. The joint distribution of p,
q, sp, and sq is given by F. We assume that sp and sq satisfy the monotone likelihood
ratio property with respect to p and q respectively, so that (for example) E{p | sp} is
increasing in sp.
Information processing As a result of an evolutionary process, the agent is equipped
with a rule φ for transforming signals into estimates of the probability of success. It will
be convenient to assume that φ is continuous and strictly increasing. It seems likely
that evolution would induce this basic consistency. The crucial restriction in our model
is that the agent must use the same rule φ for evaluating all signals. If, for example, p
and q come from different processes and with information of varying reliability, proper
updating requires that different updating rules be applied to sp and sq. Our assump-
tion is that evolution cannot build this information about the prior or signal-generation
process into the agent’s beliefs. We return to this assumption at the end of this section.
Utility Utilitymaybederivedbothfromtheoutcomeoftheagent’sactionandfromthe
action itself. A success leads to an outcome (e.g., successful reproduction) that yields a
utility of x. A failure gives the agent a utility that we can normalize to zero. The act of
accepting the option (e.g., eating the food) yields a utility of y.9 The agent maximizes
9Attaching another utility to the act of rejecting the option opens no new degrees of freedom at this
stage.124 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
expected utility given his beliefs about the probabilities of success that pertain to his
particular situation.
Evolution of utility We focus on how evolution shapes the utilities x and y. Random
mutations inject agents with various values of x and y into the population. We make
no assumptions about the process generating these mutations, though we expect the
most likely mutations to be small variations on existing utilities. Agents whose values of
x and y make them more likely to succeed will come to dominate the population at the
expenseofthosewhosevaluesyieldlowerprobabilitiesofsuccess. Ourevolutionaryen-
vironment is sufﬁciently simple (most notably featuring frequency independence) that
we can capture the result of this evolutionary process by identifying the values of x and
y that maximize the probability of success.10
Whynotevolvebetterbeliefs? Westudytheevolutionarilyoptimalutilitiesx andy fora
given information-processing rule φ. Is it possible that evolution could render our work
moot by choosing a better φ? The answer is no—we show that if a single φ must be
applied to processing all signals, then even the evolutionarily best φ will still produce
the trade-offs discussed informally above and worked out more carefully below.
The constraint that belief formation cannot be tailored to every situation (captured
simply in this setting by assuming a single φ) is critical.11 Why does evolution face con-
straints in designing our information processing? It is fairly easy to have preferences
indirectly reﬂect complicated causal chains. If some agents like carrots a little more,
and some a little less, then evolution will select those whose choices work out best, re-
gardless of how complicated is the process by which carrots affect evolutionary success.
However, making the information behind this process available to the agent’s (explicit
or implicit) cognition is a vastly more complicated problem. Designing a brain to have
a built-in knowledge of vitamin A and its connections to various aspects of the well-
being of the organism, and knowledge of how these aspects further translate into the
outcomes that really count, is itself a trial-and-error process, and one in a massively
higher dimensional space.12 Nor, for example, can we be trusted to infer this informa-
tion from our environment. An agent cannot learn the relationship between speciﬁc
nutrients and healthy births by trial and error quickly enough to be useful, and we cer-
tainlycannotlearnquicklyenoughthatevenmanygenerationsofamplefoodmightstill
be followed by famine in the next year.13
10Condition (3) below ensures that the evolutionary objective is single-peaked, so ﬁnding the optimal x
and y subject to the constraints imposed by (for example) the agent’s information processing requires only
successive local mutations.
11Without this restriction, the solution to the problem is trivial. Evolution need only attach a larger utility
to a success than to a failure, while designing the agent to use Bayes’ rule when transforming the signals he
faces into posterior probabilities, to ensure that the agent’s choices maximize the probability of success.
12We seem to be equipped with a basic but limited knowledge of grammar (see Pinker 1994). A fairly
complete description of basic grammar can be conveyed in a couple dozen pages. A summary of even our
current rather rudimentary knowledge of nutrition would run into thousands of pages, and would prob-
ably still be less useful than the guidance we implicitly receive through our tastes and their variations as
circumstances change.
13Thisconstraint iswell-acceptedinother areasofstudy. Focusing onreactionstodanger, LeDoux(1996,Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Information, evolution and utility 125
One evolutionary response to this problem is to provide more cognitive power and
more prior information. Unfortunately, passing on additional prior information taxes
the limits of trail-and-error mutations, and additional cognitive power is expensive.14
While it is obviously unrealistic to assume that we are constrained to use a single, one-
size-ﬁts-all updating rule for all situations, it seems equally obvious that information
processing must be coarse compared to the set of situations we face. In our simple set-
ting, this restriction is conveniently captured by assuming that the same rule φ must be
used in each setting.
3. WHAT DETERMINES UTILITY?
3.1 Utilities for actions
The ticket to evolutionary advantage in this environment is to maximize the probabil-
ity of a success. Why, then, doesn’t evolution simply attach utilities to the outcomes of
success and failure? This section shows that attaching utilities to outcomes alone will
be optimal if and generically only if the agent processes his signals ﬂawlessly. Hence, as
soon as the agent is an imperfect information processor, there is evolutionary value to
attaching utilities to the actions of accepting or rejecting the option. The fact that we
have utility for so many intermediate outcomes suggests that we indeed are subject to
many such imperfections.
To identify evolutionarily advantageous utility functions, we view evolution as a
mechanism designer, choosing values x and y that maximize an agent’s probability
of success. In solving this mechanism design problem, no generality is lost by taking
x = 1.15 The question is the choice of y. If y = 0, then utilities are attached only to out-
comes and not to actions. In this case, we would be motivated to eat not because we
enjoy food, but because we understand that eating is helpful in surviving and reproduc-
ing. If y is nonzero, then actions as well as outcomes induce utility.
Let ∆ be the true difference in the success probabilities of the two alternatives:
∆=p −q.
The optimal decision rule from an evolutionary perspective is then
accept iff ∆>0. (1)





been test-piloted through the ages; reasoned responses do not come with this kind of ﬁne-tuning.”
14Humans are outliers in terms of the amount of energy required to maintain our brains (Milton 1988),
the risk of maternal death in childbirth posed by infants’ large heads (Leutenegger 1982), and the lengthy
period of postnatal development (Harvey et al. 1987).
15If x > 0, then multiplying x and y by 1/x will leave the agent’s decisions unchanged. It is strictly mal-
adaptive to set x ≤0.126 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
The agent’s utility-maximizing decision is to accept if and only if y +φ(sp)x > φ(sq)x.
Given the deﬁnition of δ and that x =1, this comes to
accept iff y +δ >0. (2)
Consider
E{∆|δ =t}.
This is the expected true success-probability difference p −q conditional on the agent
having received signals that lead him to assess this difference at t.16 To make our results




so the expected difference in success probabilities p − q is weakly increasing in the
agent’s assessment of this difference.17
We then have the following characterization of the optimal utility function (as al-
ways, conditional on the information-processing rule φ).
PROPOSITION 1. The ﬁtness-maximizing y satisﬁes
E{∆|δ =−y}=0. (4)
In particular, the agent’s ﬁtness is maximized by setting y =0 if and only if
E{∆|δ =0}=0. (5)
PROOF. When Conditions (3) and (5) hold, setting y =0 ensures that the agent’s choice
rule (2) coincides with the (constrained) optimal choice rule (1), with ∆ replaced by its
conditional expected value in the latter. There is then no way to improve on the agent’s
choices. More generally, let E{∆ | δ = −y} > (<) 0. Then the expected probability of
success can be increased by increasing (decreasing) y. 
16Formally, let F be the joint measure on p, q, sp, and sq. F thus reﬂects both the prior distribution on












where it is assumed that F and φ have enough regularity to make this limit well deﬁned.
17Notice that (3) need not follow from the fact that sp and sq satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty. The complications in assessing the value of information on the margin arise, for example, from the
fact that the sum of two afﬁliated random variables need not be afﬁliated. Imagine the agent thinks that
accept isaverybadideainaparticularsetting,sothatt =φ(sq)−φ(sp)islarge. Itwouldbeanalyticallycon-
venient to know that such a large t typically meant that sq was big and sp small. But, while this is certainly
intuitive and is true in many simple examples, it is not a general implication of the monotone likelihood




















FIGURE 2. Three illustrations of Proposition 1. In Case A, the agent assesses signals correctly
(E{∆ | δ = t} = t), and setting y = 0 induces optimal choices. In Case B, the agent in general
does not assess signals correctly, but does so on the margin (E{∆ | δ = 0} = 0), and setting y = 0
again induces optimal choices. In Case C, the agent is pessimistic on the margin—when the
agent receives signals making him think that p and q are equal, expected ﬁtness is maximized
by accepting (i.e., E{∆|δ =0}>0). Optimal behavior is then achieved by subsidizing the option
(y >0, so that E{∆|δ =−y}=0) to correct the marginal inference.
From (5), if the agent interprets his signals correctly, then there is no evolutionary
value in attaching utilities to actions. The agent will make appropriate choices moti-
vated by the utility of the consequences of his actions. The agent will still sometimes
make mistakes, but without better information there is no way to eliminate these mis-
takes or improve on the expected outcome.
From (4), if the agent does not interpret his signals correctly, then evolution will at-
tach utilities to his actions in order to correct his inferences at the marginal signal, i.e.,
at the signal at which the expected success probabilities are equal. The agent must be
indifferent (y +δ = 0) when his signal would lead a perfect Bayesian to be indifferent
(E{∆|δ =−y}=0). Figure 2 illustrates this result.18
3.2 Evolution on the margin
An implication of Proposition 1 is that we should not expect utilities to reﬂect the av-
erage value of various actions to which they are attached. First, utilities are usefully
attached to actions only to the extent that agents sometimes misunderstand the likeli-
hoods of the attendant outcomes. If the outcomes are correctly assessed, then actions,
no matter how valuable, need receive no utility. Optimal utilities thus reﬂect not the
evolutionary value of an action, but the error the agent makes in assessing that evo-
18Evolution need not always ﬁnd perfect solutions, just ones that are not easily improved upon. It is
then noteworthy that our characterization of utility depends upon adjustments that we think should be
evolutionarily “easy” to implement. If E{∆|δ =−y}>0, then the expected incremental value of accepting
is positive when the agent deems it to be zero, and there are gains to be had by pushing the agent in the
direction of accepting (increasing y), and conversely. Hence, evolution can increase ﬁtness via incremental
changes in utility, based on adjustments of the form “make the agent like steak a little more,” rather than
relying on what evolutionary theorists refer to as hopeful monsters.128 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
lutionary value. Second, one might think that ﬁtness would be maximized by a utility
function that corrected this error on average. As (4) makes clear, what counts is the er-
ror the agent makes in the marginal cases where he is indifferent between two actions.
Once one realizes that it is the marginal case that counts, richer implications become
clear. The following examples illustrate.
EXAMPLE 1. In our ﬁrst example, the agent on average overestimates the value of ac-
cepting the option, but evolutionary ﬁtness is nonetheless improved by setting y > 0,
pushing him to accept the option more than he otherwise would. Let
E{∆|δ =t}=a +bt,





Assumethatδislargeonaverageandthatb <1. Becauseδisonaveragelargeandb <1,
the agent on average overestimates the value of the option. However, since y =a/b >0,
the agent’s ﬁtness is maximized by pushing the agent even more toward acceptance.
We see here the importance of the agent’s marginal beliefs: When δ = −a/b (so that
E{∆|δ}=0), the agent underestimates the relative value of the option (thinking it to be
negative), even though he overestimates it on average.
It follows from (6) that, as one might expect, a choice with a large expected value
(large a) will tend to have a large utility. It is thus no surprise that we have a power-
ful urge to ﬂee dangerous animals or eat certain foods. However, there is also a second
effect. The smaller is b, the larger is y. The point is that the less informative is the
agent’s information, holding ﬁxed his average assessment, the more negative is the rel-
evant marginal signal. Whenb is near zero, evolution effectively insists on the preferred
action. While blinking is partly under conscious control, our utility functions do not al-
low us to go without blinking for more than a few seconds. It would seem that we are
unlikely to have reliable information suggesting that this is a good idea. The experience
of trying not to cough after mis-swallowing a sip of water at a dinner party has much the
same aspect. ◊
EXAMPLE 2. This example shows that “better beliefs” generically cannot eliminate the
evolutionaryvalueofrewardingintermediateactions. Supposethatp isdistributeduni-
formly on [0,1], while (for transparency) q is degenerate at q∗ =
1
3. The signal sp simply
equals p, so that p is perfectly observed by the agent, but the signal sq is also uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. The agent thus has good information about the implications of
accepting the option, but useless information about the implications of rejecting.
Consider ﬁrst the simple information processing rule φ(s) = s, so that δ = φ(sp)−






















Agent’s decision, y =0
FIGURE 3. The optimal solution (left panel) and the agent’s behavior when y =0, for Example 2.
This holds no matter what rule the agent uses to transform signals into expected probabilities.
Lined regions show mistaken decisions. The agent’s ﬁtness is increased by setting y > 0 and
hence expanding the agent’s acceptance region.





3. Figure3shows, asafunctionofthesignalssp andsq,the
optimal outcome (left panel) as well as the outcome implemented (for any increasing
φ) when y = 0 (right panel). The lined regions identify mistaken decisions. Because
increasing y reduces the incidence of mistaken rejections more quickly than it induces
mistaken acceptances, y >0 is optimal.
There are other speciﬁcations of the signal-processing rule φ, including some (em-
bodying a more rapid response of φ to s at some points along the diagonal than others)
forwhichy isoptimallyzero. However,supposetheagentfacesamultitudeofsituations
of this type that differ in the value q∗ ∈ [0,1], and where evolution can tailor utilities to
each situation. For any φ, for only one value of q∗ will the integral in footnote 16 equal
zero at δ = 0, and hence y = 0 be optimal. Hence, in rich environments, evolution will
routinely attach utilities to the actions of imperfect information processors. ◊
The implication of Example 2 is general. For convenience, assume that signals are
drawn from the interval [0,1]. If utilities are attached only to outcomes, then the agent’s
decisionrulewillbedeterminedbythediagonallineintherightpanelofFigure3regard-
less of how success probabilities are distributed, signals are generated, and information
is processed.
COROLLARY 1. For any signal-processing rule φ, the agent’s ﬁtness is maximized by set-
ting y =0 if
E{p |sp =t}= E{q |sq =t} (7)
for all t.
PROOF. Let sp > sq. Then, by the monotone likelihood ratio property, E{p | sp}−E{q |
sq} > E{p | sq}−E{q | sq} = 0. Similarly, sp < sq implies E{p | sp}−E{q | sq} < 0. Thus,130 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
the evolutionarily optimal policy is given by the diagonal in the right panel of Figure 3.
For any given φ, this behavior is induced by setting y =0. 
REMARK. If E{p |sp =t}6= E{q |sq =t} for a nonzero-measure set of t, then the agent’s
behavior when y = 0 will generically not be evolutionarily optimal. Essentially, setting
y = 0 will then be optimal only if, when adjusting y away from zero, the expected gains
provided by making better decisions for some values of sp and sq are precisely balanced
bypayofflosses frompoorerdecisionsatother values. Inanintuitive sense, thisbalance
is nongeneric.20
Inthepreviousexample,theagent’sinformationaboutrejectingtheoptionisbiased,
yielding an average success probability of
1
2 that exceeds the actual value of
1
3. Does
this play an important role in the result? The following example shows that this bias is
unnecessary.
EXAMPLE 3. While some information imperfection is necessary if utilities are to be op-
timally attached to actions, this example shows that the agent may still be correct about
both signals on average. Again let φ(sp) = sp and φ(sq) = sq (though once again the re-
sult does not depend upon the form of φ). Suppose that q is degenerate at q =
1
4, while
the agent’s signal sq is distributed uniformly on [0,
1
2]. Now let p be perfectly observed
by the agent, and be distributed on [0,1] with density −ln p. Then both options have
an expected value of
1
4, and the agent’s expected value is correct in both cases. However,
conditional on being indifferent, the agent must have drawn a signal p ∈ [0,
1
2], and the
expected value of p −q conditional on indifference is negative.21 Evolution thus opti-
mally sets y < 0, discouraging the option. Again, we see the importance of the agent’s
valuation on the margin rather than on average. ◊
4. CHOICE-SET DEPENDENCE
Wehaveshownthatautilityforintermediateactionslikeeatingasteakonlymakessense
because the agent makes systematic mistakes in estimating their value. The key ob-
servation is that there is no reason to believe that an agent who makes such mistakes
makes the same mistakes in all contexts. In this section, we show how a setting where
the agent makes different mistakes in different contexts creates evolutionary value for a
utility function that depends on things that have no direct impact on evolutionary suc-
cess. Rather, their role is to tailor utility more closely to the speciﬁc informational con-
text at hand. How any given feature optimally affects utility thus depends both on its
direct evolutionary impact and how it correlates with errors in information processing.
20To be precise, it can be shown that for any given φ, the set of F for which E{∆|δ =0} fails to equal zero
(cf. footnote 16) is open and dense (in the weak topology) in the space of all distributions.
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4.1 Information and choice-set dependence
Suppose that the environment may place the agent in one of two situations, 1 and 2, as
illustrated in Figure 4. The success probability when rejecting the option is q in either
case, withsuccessprobabilitiesp1 and p2 whenacceptingtheoptioninSituations1and
2. The corresponding signals are sq, sp1, and sp2. As before, the agent derives a utility of
1 from a success, 0 from a failure, and utility y, the same value in both situations, from
the act of accepting the option.
For example, suppose that in Situation 2, accepting the option entails an opportu-
nity to eat a steak. As we have shown, evolution optimally attaches a utility y to steak
satisfying
E(∆|δ =−y)=0.
Now suppose that in Situation 1, accepting the option entails eating a steak at the end
of a hunting trip. The agent is likely to have quite different sources of information about
these two situations and thus to make quite different errors in processing this informa-
tion. In particular, the hunter may have an idea of what hazards he will face on the
hunting trip before achieving consumption and how these will affect the probability p1.
Only coincidentally will it then be the case that
E(∆|δ =−y, steak on hand)= E(∆|δ =−y, steak to be hunted). (8)
If (8) does not hold, the agent’s expected ﬁtness can be increased by attaching different
utilities to accepting the option in the two situations.
How can evolution accomplish this? One possibility is to attach utilities to more
actions. The agent can be given a taste for meat, a disutility for the physical exertion of
hunting, and a fear of the predators he might encounter. However, there are limits to
evolution’s ability to differentiate actions and attach different utilities to them—what it
means to procure food may change too quickly for evolution to keep pace—and the set
of things from which we derive utility is small compared to the richness of the settings
we face. As a result, evolution inevitably faces cases in which the same utility is relevant
to effectively different actions. This is captured in our simple model with the extreme
assumption that y must be the same in the two situations.22 The critical insight is then
thattheagent’soverallprobabilityofsuccesscanbeboostedifutilitycanbeconditioned
on some other reliable information that is correlated with differences in the actions.
Assume that in Situation 2, a utility of z can be attached to the act of foregoing the
option. We say that an option with this property is salient. In practice, an option is
salient if its presence stimulates our senses sufﬁciently reliably that evolution can tie a
utility to this stimulus, independently of our signal-processing.23 In our example, the
presence of the steak makes it salient in Situation 2. The question now concerns the
22Once again, what we need is that evolution cannot tailor y perfectly to each of the many situations we
face.
23The importance of salient alternatives is well studied by psychologists (Gardner and Lowinson 1993,
Mischel et al. 1992, Siegel 1979) and is familiar more generally—why else does the cookie store take pains



























FIGURE 4. Twosituations. Acceptingtheoptionissalientinthesecondsituationbutnottheﬁrst.
value of z. If ﬁtness is maximized by setting z 6= 0, then there is evolutionary advantage
to tailoring the utility gradient between accepting and rejecting the option to the two







It is immediate from Proposition 1 that choice-set dependence is unnecessary if and
only if the agent has equivalent marginal information in Situations 1 and 2:
PROPOSITION 2. The optimal utility function (x,y,z) does not exhibit choice-set depen-
dence (sets z =0) if and only if there exists t ∗ such that
E{∆1 |δ1 =t ∗}= E{∆2 |δ2 =t ∗}=0. (9)
PROOF. Given (9), the agent’s estimates of the success probabilities in Situations 1 and
2 are equally informative at the relevant margin. Setting z = 0 and y = −t ∗ ensures
that (4) holds in both situations, and there is thus no gain from choice-set dependence.
Conversely, suppose that the agent’s beliefs are differentially informative in the two sit-
uations (i.e., (9) fails). Then ﬁtness can be enhanced by attaching different utility sub-
sidies in the two situations. This can be accomplished by choosing y to induce optimal
decisions in Situation 1 and y −z (and hence z 6=0) to induce optimal decisions in Situ-
ation 2. 
For example, using choice-set dependence to boost the relative attractiveness of
steak when it is available (z < 0), in contrast to simply increasing the utility of steak
across the board (increasing y), might reﬂect a situation in which evolution ﬁnds it ben-
eﬁcial to grant substantial inﬂuence to the agent’s beliefs about the consequences of
production, while allowing less inﬂuence to his beliefs about consumption.24
An analogue to Corollary 1 is:
24Similarly, the enjoyment of sex is relevant for both heat of the moment decisions and for decisionsTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Information, evolution and utility 133
COROLLARY 2. For any signal-processing rule φ, the agent’s ﬁtness is maximized without
recourse to choice-set dependence (z =0) if sp1 and sp2 are identically distributed25 and
E{p1 |sp1 =t}= E{p2 |sp2 =t} (10)
for all signals t.
As with Corollary 1, when (10) fails, choice-set dependence is generically nonoptimal.
We can thus expect choice-set dependence to be the norm rather than the exception for
imperfect information processors.
As is the case with attaching utilities to actions, this result tells us that evolution will
generally ﬁnd it useful to exploit choice set dependence. Anyone who has ever said,
“Let’s put these cashews away before we spoil our dinner,” has practical experience with
choice-set dependence. Best of all is to be without the temptation of their presence.
Once they are there, eating is the preferred choice. Worst of all is looking at the cashews
without indulging.26,27
Whichalternativesaresalientinanygivencontextisagaintheresultofevolution. As
it turns out, a sizzling steak is salient while a steak in the grocer’s freezer is not. Cashews
on the table are salient; those in the pantry are less so. What is salient reﬂects both
the technological constraints faced by evolution and the incremental value of tailoring
utility to speciﬁc contexts.28
It is again important to stress that there is nothing surprising about making choices
that depend upon the set of alternatives. One may well eat vegetables when there is no
alternative while eating fatty foods when they are also available. But to achieve such
behavior, evolution could simply endow us with utilities for the tastes of vegetables and
fat, and let us choose vegetables as the situation dictates. With choice-set dependence,
we have one utility for vegetables when only they are available, and another when fatty
foods are also available.
aboutwhethertocourtaparticularpotentialmateorinvestinthingsmuchmoreindirectlylinkedtosexual
opportunities, suchas socialstatus. Thetendency toget carriedaway bythe heatof themoment isperhaps
again an instance of choice-set dependence, engineered to give relatively free reign to our beliefs about
social interactions while paying less attention to our less informative beliefs about the value of a given
sexual opportunity.
25It is implicit in our structure that q is distributed identically in Situations 1 and 2.
26Thaler (1994, p. xv) reports a similar incident, explaining it with much the same preferences.
27A parent on a family outing might try to avoid the sight of ice cream parlors, but agree to get ice cream
if one is inadvertently stumbled across. The preferred outcome is “no ice cream, happy kids,” next is “ice
cream,” and worst of all is “no ice-cream, unhappy kids.” Avoiding ice cream parlors can make sense even
if the parent plans to refuse ice cream when sighted, as it avoids the hassle of resisting the lobbying effort
from the three-foot-tall contingent. Substitute “medulla oblongata” for “kids,” and one has a decent model
of choice-set dependence.
28For example, it may well be of evolutionary value to tailor the utility of a steak to whether the agent
is thinking about the effect of the hunting trip on his social standing, since the agent may have a better
understanding of social structure than of the risks involved in hunting. It is also likely that evolution has
found no convenient way to build this into utility. Conversely, it seems plausible that evolution could build
anagentwhofavorsvegetablesonwarmdaysandmeatoncolddays. Whetherthisdependenceisadaptive,
and hence is likely to enter our utility, depends on whether the agent is more likely to misjudge the value of
vegetables when it is cold and meat when it is warm.134 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
4.2 Patterns of choice-set dependence
Choice-set dependence is a device for coping with imperfect information processing.
We would then expect choice-set dependence to be stronger when the agent’s informa-
tion is a poorer guide to the true state of the world. There are three reasons why this
intuition is incomplete. First, the relevant consideration in judging the quality of the
agent’s information is not just how much the agent knows about probability p or q, but
rather how much he knows relative to the underlying stochastic processes from which
these probabilities are drawn.29 Second, we must again remember that our intuition is
typically about average values, while optimal utilities are determined by marginal con-
siderations. Example 1 has provided an indication of how average and marginal eval-
uations can push in different directions. Third, utilities reﬂect not simply the agent’s
information, but expected values conditional on the agent’s information. Just as (3) is
not an implication of the monotone likelihood ratio property (cf. footnote 17), this rela-
tionship can depend upon ﬁne details of the information structure.
We begin with an example illustrating our basic intuition. If evolution has found it
optimal to subsidize an option, then an increase in the quality of the agent’s informa-
tion about the option will generally lead to a smaller subsidy. Similarly, if evolution has
found it optimal to discourage an option, then an increase in the quality of the agent’s
information will lead to less vigorous discouragement.
EXAMPLE 4. Consider two situations, as in Figure 4, with the option being salient in Sit-
uation 2 but not Situation 1. Let q be degenerate at q∗ =
1
2, and let sq be uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. The agent’s information about q is thus noisy, but unbiased. Let
the agent’s information-processing rule be φ(s)=s for all signals s.





4]. So, in Situation 2, the average value of the option exceeds that of rejection. If
y − z = 0, then the expected value of acceptance conditional on indifference exceeds




In Situation 1, let sp1 = p1, with p1 uniformly distributed on [
1
8,1]. Then the options
have the same expected value in Situations 1 and 2. However, the larger variance in
the value of p1 makes it more likely that, should the agent view the option as a bad
idea, this reﬂects an informative indication that the option is indeed not valuable. The
agent’s information is thus more valuable in Situation 1. Evolution still ﬁnds it optimal
to subsidize accepting the option in Situation 1, but not as strongly as in Situation 2.
The evolutionarily optimal utility function sets y =
1
8. To preserve the desired subsidy
in Situation 2, we have z = −
1
4, using choice-set dependence to distinguish the two
situations, with a stronger push toward accepting the option in the situation where the
agent’s information is relatively less useful.
29Hence, the agent may have quite precise information about the value of eating and relatively noisy
information about the value of hunting. But if the true evolutionary value of eating is drawn from an ex-
tremely tight distribution and the value of hunting from a more diffuse one, then the agent’s informational
advantage will be with respect to hunting.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Information, evolution and utility 135
A reverse pattern appears when evolution ﬁnds it optimal to discourage the option.





8]. Evolution now ﬁnds it optimal to set y − z = −
3
8. Let p1 be dis-
tributed uniformly on [0,
7
8]. Then evolution sets y = −
1
8, and hence z =
1
4. Choice-set
dependence is again used to exert a stronger effect on utility when the agent’s informa-
tion is relatively less reliable, in this case a stronger disincentive to accept the option. ◊
The previous example identiﬁed the agent as having better information in Situation
1. However, the agent’s signal in Situation 1 was drawn from a uniform distribution
with a larger variance (and equivalent mean) than that of Situation 2, suggesting that
the agent has less information in the former case. To reconcile these observations, no-
tice that the agent’s signal in each situation identiﬁes the underlying success probability
precisely. The distribution from which the signal is drawn is the evolutionarily relevant
prior distribution of success probabilities. When this prior is relatively diffuse, as in Sit-
uation 1, the informational advantage conferred by observing the realized probability is
relatively large.
Thefollowingexampleprovidesanotherillustrationoftheimportanceoftherelative
quality of the agent’s information.
EXAMPLE 5. Once again, let there be two situations, with the option being salient in Sit-
uation 2 but not Situation 1. Let q be degenerate at q∗ =
1
6, and let sq be uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. Let p1 and p2 both be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Let sp2 be
uniformly distributed on [0,1] but independently of p2, so that sp2 is another useless
signal. Let the agent’s information-processing rule be φ(s)=s for all signals s.
The agent has no information about Situation 2, while the expected value of accept-
ing the option is positive. The optimal utility function thus sets y −z ≥ 1, ensuring that
the agent always accepts the option.
Now suppose that the agent’s signal about the success probability p1 either equals
p1 or provides no useful information. Hence, with probability γ ∈ [0,1] the signal sp1 is
given by p1 and with probability 1−γ, sp1 is distributed uniformly on [0,1] and is inde-
pendent of p1. Then the optimal utility function has y > 0, pushing the agent toward
accepting the option in Situation 1. However, as γ increases and hence the agent’s infor-
mation in Situation 1 gets better, the optimal value of y declines to
2
3 (a value calculated
in the Appendix), with z declining similarly to preserve incentives in Situation 2. As
theagent’sinformationbecomesincreasinglypreciseinSituation1, evolutionoptimally
gives more weight to the agent’s information by reducing the utility attached to the ac-
cept option, relying upon choice-set dependence to preserve the incentives in the face
of the agent’s noisy information in Situation 2. ◊
In Examples 4 and 5, the utilities attached to actions are smaller when the agent has
better information. While we ﬁnd this pattern intuitive, the result is not universal. The
following example illustrates.
EXAMPLE 6. We again consider two situations, with the option salient in Situation 2. Let
the actual value of q be ﬁxed at
1





























situation, but not the ﬁrst.
distributed on the interval [0,
1
2] (and hence that is unbiased). Let sp1 =p1 and sp2 =p2,
with p1 distributed on [0,1] with density −lnp1, and with p2 uniformly distributed on
[0,
1
2]. It is straightforward that evolution optimally sets y −z = 0 and (from Example 3)
y < 0. In this case, the agent’s information is relatively better in Situation 1, while evo-
lution optimally chooses (with the help of choice-set dependence) to attach utilities to
actions that have no effect in Situation 2 while pushing the agent against accepting the
option in Situation 1. ◊
In this example, the agent makes good (indeed, optimal, though this is not critical
to the result) decisions in Situation 2, where his information is relatively less valuable,
while still making systematic errors in Situation 1 in spite of having relatively good in-
formation. Utilities attached to actions thus play no role in Situation 2, while they are
useful in Situation 1.
Selfcontrolandcommitment Choice-setdependencegivesrisetointernalconﬂictand
self-control, with the corresponding incentives to make behavioral commitments. For
example, suppose the environment is as shown in Figure 5. In this setting, the agent
begins by choosing between the two situations depicted in Figure 4, with accepting the
option being salient in Situation 2 but not Situation 1. Let us think of accepting the op-
tion as choosing an unhealthy but gratifying meal, while rejecting it corresponds to a
diet meal. Situation 1 corresponds to a lonely meal at home, with a refrigerator full of
diet dinners and a steak in the freezer. Situation 2 corresponds to a steakhouse with a
supplementary dieter’s menu. Suppose, as in Example 3, that the optimal utility func-
tionentailsz <0,sothatsteakissubsidizedwhenitissalient. Thentheagentmayprefer
Situation 1 even if there is some cost in choosing Situation 1, in order to ensure that he
rejects the steak.
Choice-set dependence has implications for self control beyond those of present
bias. First, difﬁculties with self control can arise without intertemporal choice. One can
strictly prefer junk food that is hidden to that which is exposed, knowing that one will
ﬁnd it painful to resist the latter, all within a span of time too short for nonstandardTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Information, evolution and utility 137
discounting to lie behind the results.30 More importantly, because our utility for one
choice can be reduced by the salient presence of another, it may be valuable to preclude
temptations that one knows one will resist. Someone who is certain she will stick to a
diet may still go to some lengths not to be tempted by rich food.31
Choice-set dependence and temptation In Examples 4 and 5, choice-set dependence
appears in the form of a utility penalty (z < 0) for not accepting an attractive option
(y > 0). This is the force at work when we ﬁnd it hard to resist a waiting (and hence
salient) steak. One interpretation of such a utility penalty is as temptation.
Introspection suggests that choice-set dependence often takes the form of tempta-
tion: when a consumption opportunity is salient, forgoing the opportunity leaves us
feeling worse than never having been offered the alternative in the ﬁrst place. We expect
choice-set dependence to often take the form of penalizing us for neglecting attractive
options. This will be the case if “evolution” is especially willing to over-ride the agent
when an option is salient. There are two reasons why we expect this to be the case. First,
we expect the agent’s information to be relatively better about production than con-
sumption decisions, while expecting the immediacy of the latter to render them more
often salient. Second, what we ﬁnd salient is also shaped by evolution. As a result, we
can in general expect that our information will be systematically better about options
that are not salient precisely because it is where our information is poorest that there is
the greatest evolutionary value in providing direct feedback in the form of utility. The
fact that we have utility for sex thus suggests that we are better at ﬁguring out how to get
sex than at calculating the beneﬁts thereof.
5. EXTENSIONS
The information processing problem that is central to our story about why we have
choice set dependent utility also provides insight into other features of our decisions
making processes.
Presently-biased preferences Presently-biased preferences may also be a useful evo-
lutionary response to imperfect information processing, allowing our model to unify
seemingly contending explanations. The utilities directly associated with consumption
typically arise contemporaneously with the consumption, while the outcomes implied
by such consumption, with their attendant utilities, occur over time. The utilities as-
sociated with a production process such as hunting or gathering are likely to be spread
30The advice to dieters that they not go to the grocery store when hungry is interesting in this light. Even
though one may be buying food only to be eaten in subsequent days, one’s current hunger makes choices
between various types of food more salient. Since the time structure of consumption in subsequent days is
unaffected by today’s hunger, this behavior is not easily explained by presently-biased preferences.
31Notice that under choice-set dependence (but not necessarily present bias), foreclosing an option is
beneﬁcial only if it makes it less salient. In contrast, the current self of an agent with presently-biased pref-
erences might wish to restrict the choice of a future self, even though it makes that future self unhappy,
because it makes other future selves happier. Thus, when Ulysses had himself tied to the mast, one can
conclude that either (a) he had presently-biased preferences, or (b) the very fact that he knew he was phys-
ically unable to approach the sirens made it less painful to be unable to do so.138 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
out, rather than occurring primarily at the time of the decision. Suppose that evolution
designs us to discount more between the current and next period than between succes-
sive periods. When evaluating a consumption decision, this has the effect of making the
agent weight the utility attached to accepting the option more heavily than the utilities
attached to outcomes. When evaluating production decisions, the extra discounting in
the ﬁrst period is relevant only to the (limited) extent that there is any utility attached
to the ﬁrst-period part of the production process. For all later utilities, the extra dis-
counting affects the alternatives of accepting and rejecting the option equally. Hence,
a present bias in preferences gives relatively greater weight to the agent’s information
about production decisions, where our expectation is that his information is relatively
more valuable.
What to fear Most of us are “irrationally” afraid of snakes (“irrationally” in the sense
that we remain afraid even on hearing that a particular snake is harmless or that a par-
ticular swamp is snake free), but few of us are afraid of mushrooms. Since both can be
potentially fatal and both can be good eating, this is puzzling. The informational per-
spective developed here suggests an explanation.
Imagine that being bitten by a poisonous snake is always fatal, and that there is 1
chance in 1000 of being bitten when venturing into a swamp actually populated by poi-
sonous snakes, with 999 chances in 1000 of noticing nothing (that is, neither seeing nor
being bitten by a snake). Imagine that ingesting a poisonous mushroom is fatal 2 times
in 1000, and results only in serious discomfort the rest of the time. The mushrooms are
theninherentlymoredangerousthanthesnakes,assumingcomparablepriorsconcern-
ing the likelihood that a swamp is snake-infested or a particular species of mushroom
poisonous.
An agent who wants to routinely cross a swamp is either right, and the swamp is
safe, or is wrong, and will eventually be unlucky and die. Even a fairly small probability
thattheswampisdangerousthusmakesitevolutionarilyvaluabletokeeptheagentout.
On the other hand, an agent who routinely wants to eat the local mushrooms is either
right and they are good mushrooms, or is wrong and may die on his ﬁrst ingestion, but
with much higher probability gets sick, realizes he was wrong, and stops eating them.
This makes it more valuable to allow the agent to risk the mushroom. Evolution should
thus make us fear not simply things that are bad for us, but rather things whose danger
we may underestimate without discovering our error before they kill us. There is thus
evolutionary value to an “irrational” fear, one that does not dissipate simply because we
claim to have information that it should.
Following your heart When gut instincts and dispassionate deliberations disagree, the
“rational” prescription is to follow the head rather than the heart. In our model, a strong
utility push in favor of an action indicates either that the action has been a very good
idea in our evolutionary past or that this is a setting in which our information has typi-
cally been unreliable. There is thus information in these preferences. The truly rational
response is to ask how much weight to place on the advice they give.32
32We think it unlikely that in evolutionary time, we systematically thought about the information that
could be rationally drawn from our emotional state. This is reﬂected in our assumption that φ does notTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Information, evolution and utility 139
Consider the question of what to eat while pregnant. Selection has given us tastes
favoring nutrients that are important for the fetus. So, even if we don’t know why pick-
les and ice cream are a good idea, the rational thing to do is to update in the direction
that they are beneﬁcial.33 Similarly, questions of when to trust have been critical in our
evolutionary past. As a result, the mere fact that one is uncomfortable about a business
deal is probably relevant information.
Insomesettings,itisclearthattheworldhaschangedinwaystowhichevolutionhas
not had time to adjust, and so the implicit advice in our preferences should be resisted.
The desirability of adding 20 pounds of fat stores before winter is in this class. While we
agree that starvation is undesirable, we reasonably believe that we face different odds
than those that shaped our evolution. In other settings, it is clear why our utilities push
us in a particular direction, but we may disagree about the desirability of the ultimate




direct evolutionary consequences, but rather because conditioning our utility on these
features makes our choices differentially responsive to the quality of our information.
The important aspects of the model from which these conclusions have emerged are
the following.
• The agent has useful information about ﬁtness. Both cultural and environmental
factors can be critical to ﬁtness and can ﬂuctuate more rapidly than the pace of
evolutionary adaptation.
• It is impossible, for reasons of complexity and (more importantly) of the difﬁculty
of building an accurate prior into the agent, to make the agent a perfect informa-
tion processor. Our results show that the very fact that we have utility for interme-
diate actions suggests that we are not perfect information processors.
• Given that we process information imperfectly, there is every reason to think that
our beliefs are sometimes more and sometimes less reliable as estimates of true
expected ﬁtness.
• Evolution has compensated for this by incorporating seemingly irrelevant factors
into our utility because they are correlated with the quality of our information.
• Thisgivesrisetoseeminglyirrational(fromtheclassicalpointofview)utilityfunc-
tions with their attendant self-control problems.
While self-control problems are irrational in a classical utility framework, it should
be no surprise that real utility functions incorporate them.
take y or z as arguments.
33Only recently do we know why it makes sense to avoid some foods for which pregnant women develop
a distaste: they contain toxins capable of crossing the placental barrier (see, for example, Profet 1992).140 Samuelson and Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
APPENDIX: CALCULATIONS, EXAMPLE 5
Consider Situation 2 in the limiting case of γ = 1 and hence the agent having perfect
information about the success probability p2. The agent is indifferent between accept-
ing and rejecting the option when φ(sp2)+y = φ(sq)+z, or δ2 = sp2 −sq = z −y. We
are then interested in the difference in the expected values of accepting and rejecting,
conditional on the agent being indifferent, or E{∆2 | δ2 = z −y}. This is the expected
value of p2 −q, conditional on having drawn signals from the intersection of the line
sp2 −sq = z −y with the unit square, given the uniform distributions of sp2 and sq on
[0,1]. Given that the expected value of q is
1
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